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Sierra Leone’s Peaceful
Resistance to
Authoritarian Rule
Robert M. Press1
Abstract: This study examines the nonviolent resistance

starting in 1977 that students, lawyers, journalists, women’s
organizations, and others, mounted against repressive rule in
Sierra Leone, a country known to many mostly for its violent
civil war (1991–2002) and “blood diamonds” that helped fuel
it. The study argues that social movement theories, though developed in the West, can help explain such resistance–but only
with some revisions. The resistance in Sierra Leone took place
without the kind of exogenous “opportunities” and resources
normally associated with movements in the democratic West.
The study offers alternative explanations that expand the usual
concept of social movements in resource-poor and repressive
circumstances. Some of the resistance came from sources not
normally recognized in traditional movements; commitment
and the power of ideas helped activists compensate for lack of
material resources. In addition, early challenges encouraged
later ones, gradually creating a culture of resistance. Moreover, the relatively small-scale of the movements and loose organization made them harder to repress.
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I. Introduction
Starting from the late 1970s, a small-scale nonviolent resistance took
place in Sierra Leone against authoritarian rule. This critical nonviolent resistance, which was later overshadowed by the bloody civil war,
lasted for more than two decades. Civilians who wrote critical articles
about the governments, challenged their moral authority, and used
strikes, demonstrations, rallies, marches, and other tactics to win
greater freedom were typically met with force. Nevertheless, some university students, journalists, attorneys, women, and other brave citizens stood up to the governments in an effort to fight for democracy,
human rights, peace, and better economic conditions.
The fact that the resistance movements were usually on a small
scale is a reflection of the repression of the governments and the fear
imposed on the civilian population, especially on dissidents or suspected dissidents. That there was any resistance at all under such conditions is a tribute to the courage, principled ideas, and in some cases
daring political ambition of the activists. It was also a reflection of the
stubborn insistence on the part of lawyers and journalists to keep supporting the rule of law and freedom of the press; of students to demand better learning conditions and exercise free speech and assembly;
and on the part of women and others to have a political voice and try
to bring an end to a civil war that was destroying the fabric of their
country and their lives.
At three critical junctures in contemporary Sierra Leone, unarmed citizens challenged the authority and legitimacy of a repressive
government. Some of the most notable manifestations of this nonviolent resistance include the 1977 student uprising against President
Siaka Stevens, the series of public marches and forums that helped
convince the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military
junta to hand over power in 1996 to an elected government, and the
mass withdrawal of cooperation from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military junta in 1997 and 1998. The noncooperation campaign helped delegitimize the AFRC, which was ousted in
1998 through international military intervention. Each of these challenges collectively helped build a culture of resistance in Sierra Leone
with earlier resistance encouraging later and broader resistance. The term
“culture of resistance” is used here to describe a process by which public
challenges to the abuse of power by a government becomes a norm for
activists and a visible segment of the general public. Individually, each of
32
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the three challenges to the governments noted above amounted to a
separate social movement aimed at ending authoritarian rule. These
three social movements each involved public challenges to government
abuse of power. Social movement theories have been used to explain
resistance in many parts of the world, including Europe and Latin
America, but they have only been applied “sporadically in Africa, and
then mainly South Africa” (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009:
43). They have “yet to be applied in a systematic way to the explosion
of nonviolent movements around the world in recent decades” (Zunes,
Kurtz, and Asher 1999: 306).
The three challenges to authoritarian governments in Sierra Leone
qualify as social movements. However, they only partially fit some of
the dominant theories of social movements that were developed primarily in the democratized West. One such theory holds that social
movements depend mostly on conditions in society that encourage
resistance, a theory commonly referred to as “opportunity structure,”
or “opening” (e.g., McAdam 1982, 2004). Another theory is resource
mobilization, which postulates that a “social movement organization
(SMO) is a complex, or formal organization,” which requires primarily material resources such as “money, facilities, and labor” (McCarthy
and Zald 1977: 1218). But as this study will show, often the activists in
the movements lacked “opportunities.” In reality, they faced repression and took high risks for their actions. As one of the poorest countries in the world, Sierra Leone experienced movements that lacked
many of the material “resources” normally associated with social
movements in the developed world.
This study offers several alternative explanations for how the social movements in Sierra Leone survived in the face of repression and
lack of clear “opportunities” or significant material resources. First,
the resistance involved a wider range of actors than are normally included in the more traditional concepts of social movements. These
included, for example, journalists who challenged the legitimacy of
the repressive governments as part of their professional responsibilities
through critical articles despite government threats. Second, those in
the resistance had a wealth of nonmaterial “resources” such as courage
and a strong commitment to the ideals of democracy and freedom
(and in some cases political ambition). Third, initial acts of resistance
gradually grew into a culture of resistance with wider participation.
Fourth, the movements were informal and loosely organized, which
made them harder to block.
33
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This study is based on qualitative research of the nonviolent resistance movements in Sierra Leone. While structural conditions and
international actions have been important factors in Sierra Leone’s political transformation, this study seeks to highlight the methods, strategies, and motives of key participants involved in the resistance. This
study draws on approximately 50 interviews conducted by the author,
mostly in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone where most of the nonviolent resistance took place.2 The main focus is on activists and the
role they played in resisting authoritarian rule.3 Most of the interviews
were with individuals who had played a significant part in public resistance to one or more governments in Sierra Leone. Most interviewees
agreed to be taped. Questions in the interview were posed in a semistructured way, starting with planned points to ask but allowing flexibility in following up on unplanned points suggested by the
interviewees. I used a “snowball” technique of locating appropriate
interviewees: starting with the better-known activists, I asked them
for further references. I also made use of archival materials, primarily
reports and other publications from human rights organizations.4

II. Historical Background
More than three centuries after Portuguese slave traders reached the
coast of what they named “Sierra Lyoa” (mountain of lions), the first
former slaves who had escaped and fought on the side of the British in
the American War of Independence arrived in Sierra Leone in April
1787 by ship from England. The settlers founded the Province of Freedom (later renamed Freetown by the Nova Scotia settlers who arrived
in 1792). Freetown was to be governed based on Christian morality,
capitalism, and rejection of slavery. The new arrivals were later joined
by other former slaves recruited by the British from Nova Scotia and
Jamaica and, after England outlawed the slave trade in 1807, by recaptured slaves from various parts of Africa. By the 1860s, wealth from
trading and some education among the recaptives led to “the beginning of Krio elite,” who considered themselves superior to the indigenous population (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 32). Outside
of Freetown, the rest of what today is Sierra Leone, was populated by a
mix of ethnic groups, including the Mende, Temne, Limba, and others.
The “ethnic balkanization” inherited at independence from the British
in 1961 was part of the weakness of the new state. It provided a way for
rulers to keep people divided, facilitating a patrimonial system that
34
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“rewarded collaborators (including the immigrant Lebanese)” but left
the majority poor (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 2).
This study begins with the resistance to the All People’s Congress
(APC) government of President Siaka Stevens. Stevens was a former
labor leader who became prime minister in 1967 but was ousted
within hours by a military coup. He was restored to power in 1968
and continued in office as executive president in 1971. He ruled
through “a combination of constitutional maneuvers, repression, intimidation, co-optation and clientelism” (Alie 2006: 93). He handed
over power in 1985 to his hand-picked successor, Major-General Joseph Momoh, whose ineffectual government, which violently suppressed student demonstrators (Alie 2006) became overwhelmed by
the struggle for multiparty democracy reform and the civil war, which
was started by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1991.
Momoh was ousted by the NPRC in 1992. The coup plotters chose
Captain Valentine Strasser to head the government. Initially many Sierra Leoneans welcomed NPRC with jubilation and hope after a long
and brutal rule and economic decline during the Stevens-Momoh era.
But the abusive behavior of members of the NPRC and their failure to
end the war helped spur a mass movement by women’s groups and other
organizations calling for their departure in favor of a democratically
elected president. Despite a “palace coup” by Brigadier Julius Maada Bio
against Strasser in January 1996, public and international pressure
forced the NPRC to proceed with multiparty elections, which led to the
election of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party
(SLPP) as president in 1996.
In May 1997, Kabbah was overthrown by an army junta calling itself the AFRC and led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who quickly invited the rebel RUF to join the government; the RUF became the
dominant force in the junta. Following the imposition of international
sanctions against the AFRC/RUF and a nation-wide popular withdrawal
of cooperation with the AFRC/RUF government, Nigerian-led ECOMOG 5 forces seized control of Freetown and drove the rebels out in
February 1998. Kabbah returned to Freetown in March 1998. The rebels
returned for a horrific few weeks of killing and raping in January 1999.
Some journalists who had criticized the junta were targeted by the rebels.
British troops arrived in 2000 and helped ECOMOG pacify the RUF
and the AFRC. The war was declared over in January 2002, once again
raising hopes of a democratic and peaceful future. In 2007, the SLPP was
defeated in a peaceful election, which brought the APC back to power.
35
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III. Theoretical Perspectives
In the post-Cold War era, peaceful resistance movements have proved
to be more effective than armed insurgencies in bringing about democracy.6 The recent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt are only the latest
in a long history of largely peaceful resistance to authoritarian rule in
Africa. There was a surge of activism for human rights and democracy
in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s (Ottaway 1997; Press 1999; Wiseman 1996). Democratization involved a revitalization of civil society
not seen since the initial struggles for independence (Bratton and Van
de Walle 1997; Chazan et al. 1992; Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan
1994; Kasfir 1998). The push for democracy and human rights in Sierra Leone from 1977 through the 1990s was part of the wider struggle for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. After several decades of
authoritarian rule in most of the region and the economic downturn
in the 1980s, people began demanding political freedom and economic progress. The pace of popular resistance, which for the most
part was non-violent, grew rapidly after the symbolic ending of the
Cold War with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and after the release
of South Africa’s future president, Nelson Mandela, in 1990. Across
Africa, “mothers, lawyers, labor leaders, students, and others took
stands in favor of greater human rights against authoritarian governments. They faced riot police, staged massive demonstrations, and in
some countries even fought tanks or resisted torture to gain new political freedoms” (Press 1999: 10). This resistance also involved an increasingly vibrant and critical media in countries such as Kenya,
Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Liberia (Olokotun 2000; Williams
2002). Bourgault noted that: “A noticeable shift has taken place in the
African media in the 1990s. Journalists have moved from defending
the compromised press of their countries to disavowing it…. A new
generation of African patriots is using new communication technologies to maintain contact with civic groups within and outside the continent” (1995: 206 and 208).
In Sierra Leone, the nonviolent resistance is a critical part of the
country’s transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. In particular,
the three social movements, which challenged the APC, NPRC, and
AFRC governments, took place without the kind of clear exogenous
“opportunities” associated with much of the social movement literature.
Goodwin and Jasper define opportunity as “factors that are relatively
stable over time and outside the control of movement actors” (2004: 4).
36
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Generally, the argument has been that social movements are most likely
to advance when there are favorable, exogenous opportunities (e.g., McAdam 1982). Tarrow notes: “Movements arise as the result of new or
expanded opportunities” (1996: 61). McAdam, one of the most prominent scholars associated with political opportunity theories, observed
that social movement theory had “privileged one kind of change process–expanding political opportunities–over all others as the proximate
cause of initial mobilization” (2004: 213). Goodwin and Jasper (2004)
call this a “bias” in the literature. While maintaining the importance of
the same exogenous factors he cited earlier (McAdam 1984), McAdam
also acknowledged that nonstructural factors were also important but
only in “rare” cases that were “unlikely to survive long enough to be
recognized as movements” (2004: 224).
Such studies minimize the role of activists in taking initiatives when
exogenous structural conditions are not present or very limited. There
were few obvious external circumstances that encouraged activists in Sierra Leone, yet resistance did occur. At various times activists faced the
threat of imprisonment, torture, even execution for resisting. While repression is not an “opportunity” in the sense of favorable exogenous circumstances, some scholars have pointed out that in the developing world
repression can sometimes stimulate resistance rather than block it (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). Sharp (2005: 47), in his much cited work on nonviolent struggles, makes a similar observation, noting that “revulsion
[against a government] for their brutality operates in some cases to shift
power to the resisters,” leading more people to “join the resistance.” This
study of Sierra Leone agrees with both these findings, but it also offers
alternative explanations as to why much of the resistance took place. It
makes several observations that bring important nuances to the study of
social movements and nonviolent resistance.
First, traditional definitions of social movements miss some of the
important resistance that can take place under a repressive government.
There are numerous definitions of social movements. In his study of protest politics in the United States, David S. Meyer views a social movement as “collective and sustained efforts that challenge existing or
potential laws, policies, norms, or authorities, making use of extra-institutional as well as institutional political tactics” (2007: 10). Goodwin
and Jasper (2009) use a similar definition. Tilly also emphasized a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities” (2004: 3). While there are divergent definitions of a social
movement, most scholars see it as a “process” instead of an organization
37
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or set of organizations (Foweraker 1995: 23). This study defines a social
movement as a process of public challenges to state abuse of power aimed
at either regime reform or regime change. Such challenges may involve
individual and/or organizational activism and mass public support
(Press 2006).
This broader definition recognizes that a social movement might
seek not just regime reform but regime replacement. In Sierra Leone, the
aim of activists became not just to reform the authoritarian governments
but also to replace them with democratic ones. Furthermore, the definition recognizes that resistance is subject to interruptions due to repression and may not always be well “organized.” It also captures resistance
by individual activists operating without the support of organizations,
something few accounts of social movements include.7 Additionally, it
comprises public challenges by professionals carrying out their work
even when it risks running afoul of a repressive regime. This can include
lawyers defending accused activists, or editors and reporters continuing
to provide news critical of a regime and exposing alleged abuses of power.
While not part of a formal social movement organization, such acts
amount to resistance in the eyes of the government and can challenge its
legitimacy and authority in the same way activist organizations do.
Second, commitment and the power of ideas can help compensate
for lack of material resources. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that
earlier theories of social movements were insufficient to explain how a
movement organizes. They emphasized the need for “resources,” including legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor. They acknowledged, however, that their arguments described the “modern American context”
and that the elements needed to get a movement going might be different elsewhere. Most of the material “resources” McCarthy and Zald
wrote about in their earlier writings were not present in Sierra Leone.
But like many oppressed people in poor countries, Sierra Leoneans had
powerful nonmaterial resources: ideas and commitment to principles
such as freedom, democracy, and human rights. In countries short of
material support, such nonmaterial resources can help sustain a resistance movement. Max Weber wrote that “ideas become effective forces
in history” (1992: 90). Former President of Czechoslovakia Vaclav
Havel, in a March 1, 1992, New York Times commentary, provides a
compelling example of Weber’s point, writing: “Communism was not
defeated by military force, but by life, by the human spirit, by conscience, by the resistance of Being and man to manipulation.” In social
movements, ideas are a key to mobilizing activists (Zald 1996).
38
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Third, even when acts of defiance are repressed and fail to win regime accommodations or concessions, they may embolden others to
make similar efforts. Resistance can gradually grow into a culture of resistance involving a broader segment of the public. The 2011 uprising in
Tunisia—inspired by the tragic immolation of young and educated Tunisian fruit seller Mohamed Bouazizi, despairing for a better life—is
only the most recent example of how a small act of defiance can encourage others to resist oppression. Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher (1999), for example, identified several social movements that began small but grew as
others were inspired by the actions of a few. One of them was the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, who started their protest against
political disappearances of their sons with just fourteen mothers in April
1977. Another was a campaign for democracy in Thailand that started in
1992 from a hunger strike by one politician. In Iran, there were 86 protests by university students in the thirteen months leading up to the fall
of the monarchy in February 1979 (Kurzman 2004). At times, church
leaders speaking out can encourage others to do so too. In 1992, a pastoral letter, “Living Our Faith” by the Catholic Bishops of Malawi, provided unprecedented criticism of alleged abuses of human rights by the
government of Hastings Banda. The letter became “a catalyst for radical
change,” encouraging mass protests that eventually led to multi-party
elections and Banda’s defeat in 1994 (O’ Máille 1999: 150). Sierra Leone’s postcolonial history shows a gradual development of a culture of
resistance in which one protest sets an example for other protests. The
public challenge to the Stevens government by university students in
1977 was unprecedented. Though minimized in the 1980s by continued
use of repression and co-optation by the government, public resistance
was much more widespread in the 1990s involving a wide swath of
society.
Fourth, small resistance movements are harder to repress and
offer some special insights on social movements. Their very looseness
and lack of a central organization makes them more difficult to stop,
especially when one considers challenges from a wide range of professionals not acting as part of any organized resistance movement. Yet
small-scale nonviolent resistance movements, such as the ones in Sierra Leone, can help undermine the legitimacy and authority of a regime by revealing the difference between stated principles of rulers
and their abusive actions and by bringing domestic and international
attention to those abuses and pressures for change. The study of small
movements allows the kind of close, detailed analysis that broader
39
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studies may miss. They offer an opportunity to probe the nuances of
resistance movements.
Yet most of the literature on movements is on large-scale resistance that typically deals with massive public demonstrations against
repressive regimes, most notably in Eastern Europe (Karklins and Petersen 1993; Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994), the Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002), Latin America (Eckstein 2001), or Iran (Kurzman 2004)
and El Salvador (Wood 2003). Studies on social movements in Africa
also typically focus on large movements (Ellis and van Kessel 2009;
Tripp et al. 2009). The few studies that address some small-scale movements include Eckstein’s (2001) study of Latin America and Press’s
(1999) work on African struggles for human rights and democracy in
the 1990s. However, even these studies were not exclusively focused
on small-scale movements.

IV. Nonviolent Resistance in Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, civil society activists used a variety of noninstitutional
tactics over time to challenge three authoritarian governments most
notably on three key issues: human rights, democracy, and peace. The
first social movement (i.e., the 1977 demonstration against President
Siaka Stevens) was largely a student movement. In contrast, pro-democracy marches against the NPRC military government (1992–
1996) involved a much broader range of civil society activists. During
the repressive reign of the AFRC/RUF junta in 1997 and 1998, the
campaign for peace and democracy took the form of a widespread
mass civil disobedience and noncooperation with the regime. Unlike
the 1977 demonstration, the social movements during the 1990s
maintained good contacts with the international and local media.
This helped highlight abuses and protect the activist, especially those
who were well known abroad. This strategy worked in part because
the two military governments were still anxious to preserve some degree of international legitimacy.

The Siaka Stevens Era
Resistance under Stevens was sporadic, dangerous, and devoid of
any active civil society network. “Everybody was afraid,” recalled Frank
Kposowa, one of the founders of an opposition newspaper called The
Tablet (1977–1981). Kposowa was arrested and tortured in 1980, but he
40
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continued his critical reporting after his release. As Kposowa noted,
chilling humor among activists was: “Make out your will before speaking [against the government].”8 A lawyer and human rights activist also
notes that people were living under a “quiet war of terror.”9
Despite the repression of the government, students at the Fourah
Bay College campus of the University of Sierra Leone organized a rare
public protest against Stevens in 1977. Students interrupted a convocation ceremony at which President Stevens was present. They held
placards demanding multiparty elections and government accountability. Hindolo Trye, president of the campus student union at the
time, recalls that Stevens “. . . was shocked. He couldn’t deliver his
speech.” The government took control of the campus with armed police and closed the college. This action prompted a widespread strike
by secondary school students who took to the streets in confrontations
with police in Freetown and upcountry, framing their message in a
chant: “No College, No School.” The strike turned into an ultimatum
to the government that if the college was not reopened, secondary
school students would not attend school. The protests were mostly
peaceful, but some witnesses recall firebombs being thrown at police
and police using live bullets in return.10 Stevens agreed to hold multiparty elections in 1977, but the victory was short-lived. Although fifteen opposition members were elected to the legislature, Stevens soon
pushed through Parliament a bill making the country a one-party
state and forcing the newly elected opposition members to either
switch over to the ruling APC or resign. All but one opposition parliamentarian switched over, much to the chagrin of activists like the late
Olu Gordon, a former lecturer at Fourah Bay College and one of the
key longtime journalistic critics of government abuses dating as far
back as 1977 with The Tablet.11
Given the poor economy, public frustrations with repression and
the nation-wide protests by students in 1977, Gordon and some other
analysts argued that the Stevens government might have been “toppled” had the labor unions joined the student protest. The Rt. Rev. Dr.
Joseph C. Humper, a former head of the Council of Churches of Sierra
Leone and the Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, called Labor’s failure to act a “betrayal of the country.”12 Labor
leader Tejan Kassim countered that communications between labor
and students “broke down,” in part due to a split in student support
for the strike based on ethnic lines. He also noted the absence of a
strike fund at the time. However, Kassim pointed out that in 1981,
41
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when economic conditions had worsened even further, some students
supported a labor-organized national strike by boycotting classes in
parts of the country. President Stevens managed to end the strike in a
few days, claiming the government had discovered an arms cache the
protesters planned to use in overthrowing the government. Kassim
denies any such plans.13 Kandeh argues that “[p]olitical activism by
the labor movement was silenced through co-optation of labor leaders
during the 1977 student crisis, and then crushed in the wake of the
1981 labor unrest” (1992: 90). Thus, two of the main potential sources
of challenge to the Stevens government at the time–students and
labor–failed to coordinate their efforts for greater effect.14 Stevens used
a variety of tactics to suppress dissent, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and executions. As Fyle pointed out, “Stevens was adept at coopting potential sources of opposition” (cited in Keene 2005: 19). He
brought labor leaders into Parliament and army and police chiefs into
the cabinet.15 Stevens also appointed as members of Parliament some
leaders of key professional groups, including lawyers and journalists.
Stevens was both ruthless and accommodating in his political strategy. As human rights attorney Jamesina King noted, he was “subtle,
but dynamic: he knew how to play the game [of politics].”16 After the
student uprising in 1977, for example, Stevens convinced delegations
from the army, legal profession, academic staff, and others to pledge
their loyalty to him.
One of the most profound outcomes of the 1977 student uprising
was the launching of The Tablet. That newspaper was founded by key
activists, including Kposowa, Charlie Kallon, Lamine Waritay, and Pios
Foray.17 During its short existence, The Tablet became a forum for critical comments against the government.18 In 1981, its presses were dynamited in broad daylight, presumably by government agents.19 Despite
this brazen act, some journalists were highly motivated to continue their
work. As Kposowa recalled, “We were young and radical. We were
hailed. People were giving us money; they called our names.” But while
some people were outspoken, others were quiet. In the 1960s, attorneys
were among the most outspoken on behalf of basic rights. During Stevens’s repression, however, “lawyers went into their shells; they were
afraid.”20 Some individual attorneys did do pro bono work in defending
activists and promoting human rights, but there were few systemic legal
challenges and no “collective” legal resistance to Stevens’s authoritarian
rule. The Sierra Leone Bar Association was “silent” through much of the
Stevens years and under the two military governments that came in the
42
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1990s. In 2005, the president of the Bar, Abdul Tejan-Cole, issued a
public “apology” for the Bar’s failure to resist authoritarian rule. The
Church, another potential source of organized resistance under Stevens,
was for the most part also “quiet.”21 The Catholic Church as an institution was notably quiet on human rights.22 Archbishop Joseph Henry
Ganda, head of the Church from the mid-1970s to 2007, apparently did
not see the government as an appropriate target for criticism and asked
outspoken priests to be quiet.23 There were “a few outspoken members of
the clergy, but others sang the praises” of the government, said the Rt.
Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Humper.24 Despite the complacency of the church,
there were notable exceptions that show the power of ideas and courage
in the resistance. Some Catholic priests, such as Moses Kaillie, spoke out
against the abuses of Stevens during sermons. In one instance, Kaillie
was called to the president’s residence after a cabinet member of the government in Kaillie’s congregation complained about his sermon. Kaillie
boldly repeated his condemnation of the abuses of the government to
President Stevens.25

NPRC Era
When the NPRC overthrew the APC government of Momoh in
1992, they were initially received with jubilation. Citizens were tired
of the long and harsh APC one-party rule and the battered economy.
However, the jubilation soon turned into frustration as the NPRC engaged in human rights abuses and failed to end the civil war. In particular, some journalists became very critical of the NPRC. One
incident that raised alarm about the NPRC occurred just three months
after it came to power. According to many eyewitness reports, NPRC
soldiers dragged a woman from her home, beat her, and sexually
abused her. This incident and other human rights violations were
widely reported by the press. In retaliation, the NPRC tried to muzzle
the independent press, including shutting down For di People, an independent and critical newspaper.26 But later that year (1993), the paper’s editor, Paul Kamara, probably the best known activist to emerge
from the 1980s and 1990s, helped launch and lead the National
League for Human Rights. It publicized NPRC human rights abuses
by sending out reports to the international press and human rights
organizations. As a result, he and his co-editor at the banned paper,
Sallieu Kamara (no relation), were called to NPRC, and in front of a
large gathering of NPRC officers the two were sternly warned to stop
43
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criticizing the junta. Paul Kamara’s response, according to Sallieu, was
to say that he intended to continue exposing human rights abuses,
which he did. In 1996, Paul Kamara was persuaded by diplomatic and
some civil society leaders to join the NPRC junta, which he did for one
month in February to help the junta prepare for a civilian, presidential
election. Later that month, Paul Kamara was nearly killed by several
unidentified gunmen after renewed reporting of alleged misdeeds of
the NPRC by his newspaper (by then unbanned) and after refusing to
sign several documents the NPRC leadership gave him to sign, which
he considered involved corruption. Sallieu, who witnessed the shooting, managed to get Kamara to a hospital.27 The NPRC was confronted
by an awakened civil society and a widening range of key activists
using a broader array of nonviolent resistance tactics. Across much of
sub-Saharan Africa, civil societies were pushing, often successfully, for
a shift to democracy and greater respect for human rights. In Sierra
Leone, the resistance took place despite the repression meted out to
civilians by the NPRC.28 The student uprising of 1977 had been a
“turning point” in the postcolonial political history of Sierra Leone, as
it marked a key moment when people began to say “enough is
enough.”29 By 1991, civil society had become bolder. As one former
journalist noted: “The war made us believe the government is not everything,” and it instilled in civil society the idea of “people power—a
culture of resistance.”30
In Sierra Leone, the material resources normally associated with
social movements (e.g. offices, funds, and equipment) were scarce, but
commitment and the power of ideas became even more important in
inspiring activists. As Brima Sheriff passionately argued, people saw
that the governments were making decisions “reflecting [the interests
of] the rich, not the poor.” He further noted that even though most
people were preoccupied with “survival issues,” the ideas of “good governance, participation, discussions, democracy” inspired them. Some
of the people who challenged the government were not in activist organizations, nor did they consider themselves human rights activists.
Sheriff, for example, was active in student politics in the 1990s but
said: “I didn’t know I was doing human rights.”31 Others took what
amounted to acts of resistance for human rights but simply considered
them part of their professional duties. Thus, the range of activists was
wider than what is normally described in a social movement. Some
individual attorneys, for example, defended accused activists and challenged the government to uphold the rule of law.32
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The main push against the NPRC came in 1995 and 1996 when
women played key roles in the protests against the junta’s failure to end
the civil war and pushed for democratic elections. During the first half
of the 1990s, a number of women activists and women’s organizations
emerged onto the political stage. One notable activist was Zainab Bangura, who became a key player in the influential Campaign for Good
Governance (CGG). CGG was formed by Bangura in collaboration
with Joe Opala and Julius Spencer to monitor the activities of the government.33 One of the most troubling developments was the growing
covert alignment between soldiers and members of the RUF. These soldiers, commonly referred to as “sobels” (i.e., soldiers by day, rebels by
night), became notorious for looting and human rights abuses (Keene
2005).34 The NPRC came to power promising multiparty elections but
ended up trying to prolong its stay. Under tremendous pressure from
civil society and the international community for free and fair multiparty elections, the NPRC appointed an Interim National Electoral
Commission, headed by retired United Nations Undersecretary General
James Jonah. With the backing of the international community, Jonah
organized the first national conference, which became known as Bintumani I (after the hotel where it was held). Jonah became a critical face of
the popular campaign for democracy. He pushed for elections despite
great personal risk. At one point, his residence and office were bombed
by suspected members of the military (Kandeh 2004a). The campaign
to move quickly to elections and replace the discredited military government galvanized civil society, notably market women and other women’s
groups. Amy Smythe, a former Minister of Gender and Children’s Affairs in Sierra Leone (1996–1998), credits the civil war and the 1995
Beijing World Conference of Women with raising the “consciousness” of
women activists in Sierra Leone, stating:
Women realized in the mid-1990s’s that they needed to go down
to the root cause of why the war started. We were affected by the
war. We mobilized and confronted the military [NPRC] . . . [to]
have women’s voices at the peace table, and at the democracy
table. The military realized late that we were serious.35

Women held marches and seminars, knocked on doors, met with
antigovernment groups in various parts of the country, wrote press
releases, and worked with men in order to get rid of the NPRC.
Smythe, who was a key organizer, said: “To have impact, we needed to
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work with men–as partners.” The women also worked with embassies
anxious to promote democracy and peace. Smythe summed up the
collaboration with the international community as one in which “they
used us and we used them.” Marie Bob-Kandeh, a vegetable seller in
Freetown, helped organize market women for the Bitumani I and II
conferences. Ordinary women clearly understood they could play an
important part in the movement. As Bob-Kandeh, notes, “We were
like a pressure group. Most of us are bread winners of the home.”36 At
the August 15–17, 1995, Bintumani I Conference, the 154 delegates
included representatives of political parties, unions, students, women’s
groups, petty traders associations, the military, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Kandeh 2004a). The delegates opted
to proceed with elections in 1996, which was a clear rejection of the
NPRC’s argument that elections should be held after the civil war had
been peacefully resolved. The NPRC’s idea of “peace before elections”
was discounted as a ploy to prolong its stay in office.
In January 1996, Julius Maada Bio overthrew Valentine Strasser in a
palace coup. Bio prevailed upon Jonah to call a second Bintumani conference to revisit the question of whether there should be “elections before peace” or the position Bio favored: “peace before elections.”
Apparently, Bio underestimated the power of the social movement
against him and against the NPRC in general. Seventy delegates arrived
at the Bintumani II Conference in February 1996. Many pro-election
supporters are said to have been prevented forcibly by government security forces from reaching the conference hall on time. At the conference,
market woman Marie Touray from Kenema captured the sentiment of
the majority when she held up a letter from her association and said she
wanted “no addition, no subtraction” from the election date previously
agreed to. Immediately, the audience started clapping and shouting “no
addition; no subtraction.”37 Fifty-six of the seventy delegates voted to
proceed quickly with elections and dismissed Brigadier Joy Turay’s warning that the state could not guarantee security for the elections. The fourteen delegates who voted to delay elections included representatives of
the NPRC and RUF (Kandeh 2004a:129). The movement to end military rule prevailed. Democratic elections were held in February 1996.

Noncooperation with the AFRC/RUF Junta
Sierra Leone’s nascent democracy collapsed in May 1997 when
the AFRC overthrew the elected SLPP government of Kabbah and
46
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formed an alliance with the RUF. The AFRC/RUF junta “systematically and ruthlessly suppress[ed] political dissent and civil society and
student militancy in the major towns and especially in Freetown. The
government indiscriminately arrested, imprisoned, and tortured journalists, demonstrators and anyone who was critical of the AFRC”
(Alie 2006:179). Despite the brutality, students courageously marched
in protest against the junta on August 18, 1997. The junta violently
suppressed the protest during which many people were killed, injured,
or raped (Alie 2006). However, Sierra Leone’s civil society, which had
learned how to mobilize against oppressive governments, remained resilient. People were tired of the civil war and coups and were ready to
give democracy another chance. The elected SLPP government in exile
wanted to come back to power. When the AFRC seized power, many
people referred to it as “APC # 2.” Many people saw the AFRC as the
reincarnation of the old APC, which they opposed and saw as the
source of their political and economic plight (Bah 2011). People noted
that the AFRC brought back the same cronies who had served in the
APC one-party regime.38 From the point of view of SLPP supporters,
the junta was repressive in ways that harkened back to the Stevens era.
In particular, it tried to muzzle the independent press. Ironically, the
AFRC/RUF had support, albeit limited. Kelvin Lewis aptly summed
up the divide: “The whole country was divided—you were either for or
against” the junta. A number of civilians accepted key appointments
to the government, which blurred “the line between the ‘good’ and the
‘bad’–between the ‘bad’ rebels and the ‘good’ opposition.”39
Instead of acquiescing to the AFRC/RUF junta, activists and a wide
segment of the general public organized a new social movement using
different tactics. The junta leaders were desperate for domestic and international acceptance, but they found neither. Instead they were met with
widespread withdrawal of cooperation by civilians, which isolated the
junta and paved the way for the international military intervention. The
predominant slogan of civil society opponents of the AFRC/RUF was
“you are illegitimate; step down.” Given the extreme repression of the
junta, the most realistic way to deliver the message of illegitimacy was
through mass withdrawal of support and civil disobedience, which were
part of a wider campaign of noncooperation with the junta. Much of the
country’s normal functions shut down: banks closed, civil servants
mostly failed to show up for work or showed up and did little or nothing
and labor and teacher unions urged their members to stay home (Alie
2006). Similarly, stores, schools, and markets were often closed.
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At the same time, some journalists and editors took major risks reporting on AFRC/RUF excesses. From the point of view of the government, this was resistance. For example, because of his critical reporting
on the junta for the Standard Times in 1997 and 1998, Ibrahim KarimSei received almost daily calls from the military, including numerous
death threats. He was arrested in November 1997 but resumed his reporting after his release. His deputy, Paul Mansaray, was murdered in
January 1999. Karim-Sei recalled that for nine months he could not
sleep in his house, but, he added: “It was a risk worth taking because we
were fighting for redemption of our nation.”40 Other activists simply saw
what they did as part of their job. Jonathan Leigh’s gestures and words
during an interview poignantly capture this sentiment. When asked
why he took such risks, he simply took a close look at the interviewer as
if the answer should have been obvious and said: “I was a journalist.”41
The AFRC allowed some critical newspapers to continue publishing
but cracked down hard when the government deemed their reports threatening to its interest. A number of newspapers went underground, operating from clandestine locations and risking violent reprisals from the
junta.42 About a dozen newspapers continued publishing, including some
that were pro-junta. Newspapers such as Standard Times, Independent
Observer, For Di People, and Quill published articles exposing junta abuses
and excesses. Leigh was arrested in 1997 for an article about junta members looting a shop in Freetown. He was blindfolded, beaten with rifle
butts, and taken to a military camp where another journalist, John Foray,
was also held. As Leigh painfully recalled, “I was given twelve lashes seriously with a stick. The place we slept was like a dungeon, with moldy
ground.”43 Like Voice of America reporter Kelvin Lewis, who was slashed
by a machete-wielding rebel and held overnight in a storage container,
Leigh was released quickly after a barrage of international complaints.
The mass civilian, noncooperation strategy against the junta raises
two important points in the nonviolent resistance to political repression in Sierra Leone. First was the issue of fear. The brutality of the
junta instilled genuine fear among the people. As one respondent
stated, “People stayed home out of fear; you could get killed in the
streets.”44 The AFRC/RUF was extremely brutal, carrying out numerous extrajudicial killings and engaging in looting and rape. Survivors
of the AFRC oppression in Freetown often sum up their experience as
“We thought we’d all be dead.”
Second, the noncooperation was also a classic case of peaceful but
profound resistance to authoritarian rule. As one of the leading experts
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on non-violent resistance notes, noncooperation weakens a regime’s authority: “All rulers require an acceptance of their authority: their right to
rule, command and be obeyed . . . . The weakening or collapse of authority . . . sets in motion the disintegration of the rulers’ power. Their
power is reduced to the degree that their authority is repudiated” (Sharp
2005: 31). The campaign of noncooperation was loosely coordinated.
There were frequent and secret meetings between activist leaders and
among students planning the August 18, 1997 antijunta march. People
formed “cells” of two to three trusted friends to discuss politics or simply
plan how to get food for their families. As the number of government
informants grew, people devised new strategies to pass coded messages
from cell to cell.45
Radio Democracy, a clandestine operation set up across the bay
from Freetown in Lungi, played a key role in the noncooperation campaign. Radio Democracy was headed by Julius Spencer who later became Minister of Information in the Kabbah government. There were
opposition informants from within the government and a wide network
of people secretly passing information to Radio Democracy. Radio Democracy tried to destabilize the junta by exposing its plans and countering its claims with its own propaganda. It also encouraged noncooperation
by “instilling some fear into people: anybody cooperating with the junta
would be seen as collaborators.”46 Despite the obvious fact that Radio
Democracy was formed around the SLPP and served a propaganda medium, it also provided a ray of hope to a country that was in deep chaos.
It uplifted the morale of the opposition, encouraged civil disobedience,
and promoted a “people’s agenda” against the military.47
The junta was seriously undermined but not defeated by the nonviolent campaign. The junta’s defeat ultimately came from the international intervention force, but the nonviolent campaign had provided
the vital moral rationale for the international intervention by ECOMOG and British forces. Had the civilian population remained silent
or provided clear support for the junta, intervention would have been
less likely. Resistance to the junta and exposure of its abuses delegitimized it and made it easier for the international community to intervene on behalf of the masses of oppressed people.

V. Conclusion
In Sierra Leone, the repression of successive postindependence authoritarian governments and a brutal civil war led to three nonviolent social
49
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movements. The 1977 student uprising against President Siaka Stevens
was followed by the launching of The Tablet, which, along with other
independent newspapers such as For Di People, became key instruments
in the resistance against authoritarian rule. A series of public marches
and forums in support of multiparty elections helped convince the
NPRC military government to hand over power in 1996 to an elected
government. Finally, the mass withdrawal of cooperation from the
AFRC and daring journalist reporting about junta abuses helped pave
the way for a robust international military intervention. All three movements sought to advance human rights, democracy and peace.
Contrary to the argument of much of the social movement literature that exogenous “opportunities” and material resources are usually
deemed essential for a successful social movement, the three social
movements in Sierra Leone survived despite the lack of such advantages.
Several factors accounted for the survival and success of the movements.
There was a high level of commitment among key activists, demonstrating the important role ideas and the human spirit play where material
resources are very limited. The three social movements together helped
develop a culture of resistance that expanded in the 1990s along with the
Africa-wide growth of civil society and demands for democracy and
human rights. The movements, which never became very large, were
only loosely coordinated, making them harder to stop. Moreover, many
people were drawn into the resistance reluctantly, becoming heroes in
the eyes of the public simply by insisting on doing their job as journalists, teachers or students. Others saw a chance to gain or regain political
power through the efforts to resist and delegitimize the authoritarian
governments. Reluctant heroes and opportunists alike faced serious risks
for their activism and collectively helped end authoritarian rule in Sierra
Leone. When repression became too severe, activists either fled the
country or went underground, but some resurfaced, came back and continued the resistance, sometimes after arrest and even after torture.
Counting such actions as part of the social movements, something not
normally done in the literature, is important because it reveals broader
opposition than one might suspect if looking only at organizations that
specifically identified themselves as part of an activist campaign.

Notes
1. Acknowledgements: This study would not have been possible without the cooperation of the many Sierra Leoneans I interviewed. In
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Sierra Leone I am especially grateful to Ambrose James, Desmond
George-Williams, Abdulai Bayraytay, the late Olu Gordon, Beresford Davis, Sallieu Kamara, Brima Sheriff, and historian Joe Alie,
among others, for their patience with my many contextual questions as well as for sharing details of their own activities. Comments and suggestions from the editors and the two anonymous
reviewers were most helpful. A Fulbright teaching and research
grant and additional support from the University of Southern Mississippi for the 2008–2009 academic year funded the Sierra Leone
travel and research. This is a much revised version of a paper first
presented at the American Political Science Association annual
meeting in 2010, then revised for the African Studies Association
annual meeting also in 2010.
2. One limitation of this study is the almost exclusive focus on interviews conducted in Freetown of activists and others. But that is
where, by far, most of the nonviolent resistance took place. There
were several student demonstrations in the 1980s outside of Freetown, and further research may well discover other examples of resistance in rural areas. But due to teaching commitments at Fourah
Bay College during the academic year the author spent in Sierra
Leone on a Fulbright Fellowship (2008–2009), it was not possible
to track down such examples. And from 1977, the starting point of
this study to 1991 when the civil war began, there were few significant examples of resistance even in Freetown itself. Later the civil
war precluded most non-violent activism upcountry; thus the study
did not attempt to document resistance outside the capitol.
3. This led to a wide range of former activists, including lawyers, civic
organizational leaders, and activists in women’s groups, students,
journalists, market women, academics, and others.
4. Since the focus of the study was not a numerical or quantitative
documentation of resistance events, the study does not include a
search of available newspaper archives in Sierra Leone, though I did
look at some issues of The Tablet, an opposition newspaper that became a rallying point for opposition to the government of Siaka
Stevens. Thus future research might well be conducted focusing on
these resources. But it would not be an easy task to sort out from
the openly-biased newspapers which ones present an accurate account of events. Many papers were (and still are) aligned with particular political parties.
5. ECOMOG is the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community
of West African States.
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6. A study covering 67 countries and transitions over the previous
three decades found that there was “more than a three to one
chance” of a country achieving transition to political freedom
where the civic opposition is nonviolent or mostly nonviolent
(Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005: 8). Another study, by Stephan
and Chenoweth (2008) of 323 nonviolent and violent resistance
campaigns from 1900 to 2006, found that “major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53% of the time, compared with 26%
for violent resistance campaigns.”
7. An exception to this is a brief mention by DeLeat that “. . . nongovernmental organizations and individuals are at the forefront of the
struggle for universal human rights” ((2006: 60; emphasis added).
8. Frank Kposowa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 15, 2009. In 2007
he was elected to Parliament as an SLPP opposition member.
9. Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 2, 2009.
10. Olu Gordon, Freetown, Sierra Leone, November 28, 2008.
11. Olu Gordon, Freetown, Sierra Leone, November 28, 2008.
12. Joseph C. Humper, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 20, 2009.
13. Tejan Kassim, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 7, 2009.
14. During the presidency of Momoh, university and secondary school
students staged another demonstration in 1987 at Njala University
near Bo, which spread to Kenema.
15. Stevens was not the only leader in Sierra Leone to use this tactic.
Keene notes (2005: 2) that under President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah,
elected in 1996, “co-option was one key to survival” of the
Administration.
16. Jamesina King, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 17, 2009.
17. Pios Foray, Sierra Leone, February 2, 2009.
18. Although it attempted to be a regular newspaper, it was also clearly an
opposition paper championing human rights and democratic freedoms, attracting writers such as Gordon. At times, the editors bent
the rules of objective reporting and considered themselves engaged in
a propaganda battle against the government, using “words as a choice
of ‘arms.’ We had no respect for ethics–I’m being honest,” said one of
the founders (Frank Kposowa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 15,
2009).
19. Olu Gordon, one of the contributors to The Tablet, said government
agents were responsible, in retaliation for The Tablet’s support of
the labor strike organized in 1981.
20. Frank Kposowa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 15, 2009.
21. Abdul Tejan-Cole, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 24, 2009. Sierra
Leonean historian C. Magbaily Fyle, in an interview, January 23,
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2009, in Freetown, argued that the Bar was “in the forefront” of
pressing the Administration of President Joseph Momoh (1985–
1992) to allow multiparty elections, which he eventually agreed to.
But that was not considered as repressive a period in which to make
such demands.
22. Charles Mambu, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 22, 2009. Mambu
was Director of the Coalition of Civil Society and Human Rights
Activities at the time of the interview.
23. Patrick Johnbull, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 22, 2009.
24. Joseph C. Humper, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 20, 2009.
25. Patrick Johnbull, Freetown, Sierra Leone,, April 22, 2009.
26. Sallieu Kamara, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 20, 2009.
27. Sallieu Kamara, Freetown, Sierra Leone, August 9, 2011.
28. One could argue that political shifts across Africa, the ending of
the Cold War, and new international interest in human rights provided an “opportunity” for activists against the NPRC. To some
extent that was the case. But on a day-to-day level, the NPRC was
abusive, unpredictable, at times violent, and committing “successive violations” of the law and human rights (Sallieu Kamara, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 20, 2009).
29.Brima Abdulai Sheriff, Freetown, Sierra Leone, September 10, 2008.
30.Sallieu Kamara, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 20, 2009.
31.Brima Abdulai Sheriff, Freetown, Sierra Leone, September 10, 2008.
32.Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 2, 2009.
33. When Ernest Bai Koroma was elected President in 2007, he appointed Bangura Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation.
34. This element of collusion is not limited to soldiers. Politicians from
both dominant parties, the All People’s Congress (APC), which Siaka
Stevens headed for many years, and the Sierra Leone People’s Party
(SLPP), were both widely considered to have close links to one military faction or the other in the civil war. There was “behind-thescenes bolstering and even incitement of military factions, with SLPP
and APC elites both said to be involved” with SLPP links to the
NPRC and APC links to the rebel Revolutionary United Front or
RUF (Keene 2005: 280.) It is worth noting, perhaps, that the NPRC
military coup in 1992 ousted the long-ruling APC party; and the
AFRC military coup of 1997 ousted the elected SLPP government.
35. Amy Smythe, Freetown, Sierra Leone, January 31, 2009.
36. Marie Bob-Kandeh, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 2, 2009.
37. Marie Touray, Kenema, Sierra Leone, February 2, 2009.
38. Ambrose James, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 13, 2009.
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39. Kelvin Lewis, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 13, 2009.
40. Ibrahim Karim-Sei, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 20, 2009.
41. Jonathan Leigh, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 13, 2009.
42. Olu Gordon, Freetown, Sierra Leone, November 28, 2008. Gordon, a former university student activist in the 1970s, was a veteran
journalist with a record of critical reporting from the late 1970s
through the AFRC period. He died in 2011.
43. Jonathan Leigh, Freetown, Sierra Leone, February 13, 2009.
44. Beresford Davis, Freetown, Sierra Leone, December 2, 2008.
45. Shellac Davies, Freetown, Sierra Leone, January 28, 2009.
46. Julius Spencer, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 18, 2009. Spencer
helped organize Radio Democracy; Hannah Foullah was one of
those working closely with him on the broadcasts.
47. Ambrose James, Freetown Sierra Leone, February 13, 2009.
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